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 The conventional result of the theory of the public enforcement of law is that
 wrongful convictions of innocents are detrimental to deterrence. This proposi-
 tion has been challenged recently. In some cases, wrongful convictions do not
 jeopardize deterrence, because they influence equally the innocent and the guilty.
 Therefore deterrence does not change. We show that, in general, wrongful con-
 victions do lower deterrence. We prove that wrongful convictions do not jeopar-
 dize deterrence only in very limited circumstances or under unlikely assumptions.
 (JEL: K4)
 1 Introduction
 In most of the economic literature, judicial errors are usually understood as wrongful
 convictions of actually innocent defendants and wrongful acquittals of actually
 guilty defendants.1 In the literature on optimal deterrence that followed the seminal
 work by Becker (1968), wrongful convictions came first into focus with the work
 of Harris (1970), who extended the model to include the social costs of wrongful
 convictions. Recent surveys of the standard theory of optimal deterrence show how
 wrongful convictions are as detrimental to deterrence as wrongful acquittals (for
 example, Polinsky and Shavell, 2007).
 The conventional result that wrongful convictions hurt deterrence is based upon
 the work of Png (1986). On one hand, wrongful acquittals improve the expected pay-
 offs of committing crime, but, on the other hand, wrongful convictions decrease the
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 These are the so-called outcome errors. Legal scholars also distinguish factual er-
 rors , for which the relevant facts are erroneously identified, and legal errors , for which
 the proper legal standard is mistakenly assessed; see Khanna (2002). We refer only to
 the first type of errors.
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 expected payoffs of staying honest. On balance, an increment in either probability
 decreases deterrence. Therefore, Png makes two relevant points: (i) wrongful con-
 victions (and not only wrongful acquittals) diminish deterrence; and (ii) wrongful
 convictions and wrongful acquittals are equally bad in their effect on deterrence. At
 the margin, one further wrongful conviction induces as many individuals to switch
 behavior from compliance to noncompliance as one further wrongful acquittal.2
 In a provocative paper, Lando (2006) questions the conventional result of the
 theory of the public enforcement of law that wrongful convictions of innocents are
 detrimental to deterrence. He distinguishes between mistakes of act and mistakes
 of identity, and claims that, for the latter, wrongful convictions do not jeopardize
 deterrence. Mistakes of act happen when somebody is convicted for a crime that did
 not actually happen. As an example, Lando points to the case of speeding tickets,
 where the police fail to report the actual speed correctly because of measurement
 errors. But it could be also the case for insider trading in corporate criminal law,
 or tacit collusion in antitrust law.3 These are typically cases for which the principal
 question faced by the court is whether or not there was any actual crime. These
 potential crimes are difficult to prove because there is no evident "smoking gun."
 Mistakes of identity happen when one individual is punished for a crime committed
 by somebody else. In the context of evident crimes, such as murders and robberies,
 the wrong person can be incriminated for an act that actually did happen.
 The novel argument proposed by Lando is the following. When mistakes of
 identity happen, and also when criminals can be punished for the crimes of others,
 then the expected returns to not committing the crime decrease equally for the honest
 and for the criminal. Thus, individuals do not switch behavior; in other words,
 deterrence is not jeopardized. In the present paper, we show that Lando's claim can
 only be true in very limited circumstances or under unlikely assumptions. More
 generally, it is realistic to suppose that wrongful convictions do lower deterrence as
 suggested by the conventional literature.
 A numerical example is illustrative. Suppose the probability of conviction of
 a criminal is 0.5 and the fine is fifty dollars. The expected fine is twenty-five dollars.
 Everyone who derives a benefit higher than twenty-five dollars from committing
 a crime is not deterred.
 The idea developed by Png is the following. Suppose the probability of conviction
 of an innocent is 0.1. The expected fine paid by an innocent is five dollars. As
 a consequence, anyone who derives a benefit higher than twenty dollars (twenty-
 five dollars minus five dollars) from committing a crime is not deterred. Deterrence
 has been diminished as a consequence of wrongful convictions.
 2 In this stream of literature one should also mention the work of Ehrlich (1982),
 who suggested the hypothesis that the conviction of the innocent may increase (instead
 of decrease) deterrence if such conviction is perceived by other imperfectly informed
 would-be offenders in society as a correct conviction of a guilty individual.
 3 A wise stock investment may be misread as insider trading, a certain competitive-
 market equilibrium may be misunderstood as tacit collusion, and a suicide may be
 mistaken for a homicide.
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 The point raised by Lando is that the example we have developed so far applies
 only to mistakes of act. When we consider mistakes of identity, a criminal can
 also be wrongfully convicted. The expected fine of five dollars is borne by both
 innocents and guilty equally. As a consequence, the threshold is still twenty-five
 dollars, and deterrence has not been jeopardized. His conclusion is driven by the
 assumption that the probability of a mistake of identity spreads thin over the entire
 population of both innocent and guilty individuals (whereas mistakes of act only
 concern innocents).
 However, an important implication of the existence of mistakes of identity has
 been overlooked. For every wrongful conviction (of either an innocent or a guilty in-
 dividual) there must be a wrongful acquittal of a factually guilty individual. In other
 words, for mistakes of identity, one must equalize the number of mistakes with the
 number of crimes committed in order to balance the demand and the supply for mis-
 takes. We show that, in general, wrongful convictions do lower deterrence. Even if
 the probabilities of mistakes influence innocents and guilty equally, deterrence goes
 up because these probabilities of mistake of identity also affect wrongful acquittals.
 Looking at our numerical example, we propose that if the probability of conviction
 by mistakes of identity is 0.1 for both guilty and innocent, then the probability of
 a wrongful acquittal has to go up, for example, to 0.6 in order to have a balance be-
 tween mistakes of identity and crimes committed. As a consequence the probability
 of rightful conviction is now 0.4, and not 0.5. The critical threshold is again twenty
 dollars. Deterrence has been jeopardized as a consequence of mistakes of identity.
 In this paper we contest the idea that wrongful convictions do not dilute deterrence
 when we consider mistakes of identity. Notwithstanding, more generally, Lando
 acknowledges that wrongful convictions may still diminish deterrence for other
 reasons: (i) given the existence of a criminal opportunity, the relative payoff of
 staying honest is reduced if others commit a crime and therefore increase the risk
 of a wrongful conviction; (ii) the conviction of an innocent often implies that the
 real wrongdoer is free, and this could further dilute deterrence; (iii) the risk of
 being mistakenly punished for a higher-order crime induces the criminal to commit
 another, lower-order crime (a standard marginal-deterrence argument).4
 The paper goes as follows. Section 2 develops a formal model. Final remarks are
 addressed in section 3.
 2 The Model
 In this model, there is only one type of crime.5 Individuals have to decide whether
 or not to commit this crime, and each individual can commit the crime only once.
 4 As to (iii), the result can be reversed if (as Lando argues) the choice is continuous
 and not discrete (the wrongdoer can tune the degree of care). Furthermore, wrongful
 convictions might increase deterrence if correct sentencing for a given crime increases
 the likelihood of a wrongful conviction in the future.
 There are different possible interpretations. There are crimes for which both types
 of errors can happen (such as the speeding example). Alternatively, consider two dif-
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 Individuals are then tried in court and sanctioned subject to the two types of errors:
 wrongful convictions and wrongful acquittals. Let b be the gains to the individual
 from committing the crime, and s the sanction imposed by the court.
 Let us define £1 as the probability of wrongful acquittal for a crime one has
 committed (hence a conditional probability given guilt); e2 as that of wrongful
 conviction for a crime that has not been committed (a conditional probability given
 innocence); and £3 as that of wrongful conviction for someone else's crime. This
 last probability applies to innocents and guilty alike (hence £3 is an unconditional
 probability). Figure 1 summarizes the different possibilities from the viewpoint of
 person A when there is another crime committed by person B.6
 Notice that the game tree describes the most generic game and in principle
 concerns both mistakes of act and mistakes of identity. We confront here two
 models, one where there are mistakes of act and the other where there are mistakes
 of identity. Mistakes of act are convictions for crimes that never happened and
 thus for which there are no corresponding criminals acquitted. In this case the
 probabilities of wrongful convictions and wrongful acquittals are independent, and
 thus an increase in wrongful convictions does not imply any change in the proportion
 of wrongful acquittals. Mistakes of identity, instead, are crimes for which the wrong
 ferent crimes (one to fit mistakes of act and one to fit mistakes of identity) subject to
 the same social cost and the same probability of being detected.
 6 If £3 only applies when person A has not been convicted of crime A, in the con-
 text of Figure 1, then Lando' s result never holds, because all three errors reduce deter-
 rence.
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 person is convicted for a given crime, and for the same crime, a guilty individual
 is wrongfully acquitted.7 In this case, wrongful convictions and wrongful acquittals
 for a given crime are linked, as the conviction of an innocent person implies the
 acquittal of the person actually responsible for it.
 The expected sanction borne by a criminal is (1 - £' 4- £3)5, and the expected
 sanction borne by an innocent is (s2 + £3)^ An individual commits the crime as
 long as b>b*, where
 (1) ** = (l-e1-c2)s.
 Let us normalize the population to one and denote by G ib) the cumulative distribu-
 tion of b. Then, G(b*) is the population of innocents, and 1 - G(b*) is the population
 of criminals. For convenience, define n = 1 - G(b*) and therefore G(b*) = 1 - n,
 where n is the crime rate.
 Under the model developed by Png (1986), there are only mistakes of act, and
 they affect only innocents:
 Png' s Symmetric Result Assume s2 > 0 and s3 = 0. Wrongful convictions
 jeopardize deterrence.
 The result is immediate from (1). The relationship between n and e2 is positive,
 showing that the crime rate goes up with the probability of wrongful convictions.
 Let us now assume, as in Lando (2006), that there are only mistakes of identity.
 The following proposition holds:
 Lando' s Result Assume e2 =0 and e3 > 0. Wrongful convictions do not jeop-
 ardize deterrence .
 The result is again immediate from (1). Once the probabilities of wrongful con-
 victions of guilty and innocent cancel out, the crime rate is not affected by wrongful
 convictions. Lando's intuition is that the possibility of occurrence of wrongful con-
 victions also for other criminals undermines the conventional wisdom. If Lando's
 assumption is correct, then wrongful convictions have no effect on deterrence, while
 wrongful acquittals diminish deterrence. However, his insight neglects an important
 balance between mistakes of identity and actual crimes.
 In fact, notice that while mistakes of act are convictions for crimes that never hap-
 pened and thus for which there are no corresponding criminals acquitted, mistakes
 of identity, instead, are crimes for which the wrong person is convicted for a given
 crime, and for the same crime, a guilty person is wrongfully acquitted.8
 7 Lando argues that these are the cases where the occurrence of a crime is incon-
 trovertible; only the identity of the criminal is questionable. There are of course crimes
 that are borderline; think for instance of cases of looks-like homicides that in fact are
 suicides, or of unintentional losses that are taken as thefts (for which thus a mistake of
 act becomes a mistake of identity).
 8 In the case of mistakes of act, the crime rate is overestimated, as there are more
 crimes than actual criminals. This should not be a problem as long as the population
 is sufficiently large.
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 Figure 2
 The Game Tree under Png's and Lando' s Restrictive Assumptions Respectively
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 Therefore, if there is a mistake of identity, then there is only one wrongful
 conviction (either of an innocent or of a guilty person) for every wrongful acquittal.9
 Given this equality, we can equate the following:
 (2) €in^ = e3n + £3(l -n) .
 supply of errors demand for errors
 The expression (2) describes the supply-demand equilibrium in the market for errors
 when mistakes of identity occur. Applying our notation, we also have that
 (3) i-n = G[(l-el-s2)s].
 Together, (2) and (3) determine n(s2 , £3, s) and £i(e2, £3, s) in equilibrium. Let us
 now analyze how the equilibrium is perturbed when there is a marginal variation
 of £3. We differentiate both equations (2) and (3):
 E'dn + nde ' = de 3,
 dn = g{-)sds'.
 By substitution, we get
 (4) - = g(-)*
 de 3 n + g(-)se 1
 Clearly, from (4), dn /de 3 > 0 for all e2 and £3. The number of criminals increases
 with the probability of mistakes of identity. The reasoning is the following: Higher
 likelihood of wrongful convictions increases the demand for errors. As a conse-
 quence, the supply of errors has to increase for the sake of equilibrium. Therefore,
 necessarily the number of criminals has to increase.
 9 We can easily generalize the model for the possibility that there is a wrongful
 conviction for x wrongful acquittals.
 230 Nuno Garoupa and Matteo Rizzolli JITE 168
 From (2) and (3), we can also see that the result obtained by Lando only holds
 under a specific assumption. By applying total differentiation to (2) and (3), we
 obtain
 dn _ g(')sde3 + ng{-)sde2
 n + g(-)ss i
 Therefore, in order to conclude that dn = 0 as Lando did, we would need to
 have ds2/de3 = - '/n. When the likelihood of mistakes of identity increases, the
 likelihood of mistakes of act must decrease in a particular way (namely, at rate
 -1 /n). There is no reason to think that such assumption is satisfied in general, and
 particularly in the examples offered by Lando.
 3 Final Remarks
 Generally speaking, wrongful convictions do lower deterrence unless some specific
 relationship exists between mistakes of identity and mistakes of act. The conven-
 tional result of the theory of public law enforcement seems to be robust to the
 possibility that wrongful convictions also affect criminals.
 Refuting the generality of Lando's argument has important theoretical and pol-
 icy implications. Rules of evidence, as well as other characteristics of criminal
 procedure, all seek to produce as few wrongful convictions as possible even at
 the cost of allowing many wrongful acquittals. If Lando's insight were of general
 application, deterrence-based explanations would be flawed, since wrongful con-
 victions should be simply irrelevant. The pro-defendant bias of criminal procedure
 would have to be explained in other terms. Our model points out that Lando's
 insight is of little practical applicability. Therefore, our model supports the basic
 theoretical framework and supports the significant relevance of a growing body of
 work explaining why wrongful convictions are more socially costly than wrongful
 acquittals.10
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